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Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic 
 
Abstract: ‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if 
reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is 
true. The view says that, first, there is ‘One True Logic’; second, that the One True 
Logic is made true by the mind-and-language-independent world; and third, that 
the mind-and-language-independent world makes it the case that the One True 
Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the 
way, I discuss a few alternatives, clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical 







Many philosophers think that there is ‘One True Logic’: that there is a single logic (or, perhaps, a 
small plurality of logics) that is objectively correct.1 But what this means is slippery. Beyond the 
claim that certain general logical principles (e.g., many think, the Law of Non-Contradiction) are 
true, it is unclear what it means for there to be OTL, and in particular, what makes the OTL true.  
 
The first aim of this paper is to make explicit one view about what makes the OTL true: 
metaphysical logical realism. This view takes the OTL to either correspond to the structure of 
mind-and-language-independent reality or to be located in mind-and-language-independent 
reality. In section one, I’ll distinguish this view from other views about what make the OTL true. 
The second aim is to argue (in section two) that if reality has a privileged structure, then 
metaphysical logical realism is true. Section three addresses the issue of whether logic is a 
unified subject.  
 
Why should we care whether metaphysical logical realism is true? One reason is that it conflicts 
with various assumptions that are often made about logic; e.g. that logic is topic neutral; that it is 
ontologically neutral; that inquiry into logic is special and distinct from other kind of theoretical 
inquiry; that logic is not revisable; and that logic is wholly a priori, whereas other kinds of 
inquiry are not. (All of these assumptions might be motivated by thinking that logic has nothing 
to do with the world.) Many neo-Quinean “anti-exceptionalist” philosophers of logic (e.g. 
Hjortland (2017), Maddy (2002, 2007, 2014), (Priest (2006a, 2014), Russell (2014), Williamson 
(2013, 2017)) reject some or all of these assumptions, but often seem to do so for distinct reasons 
from those I present here. More importantly, my sense is that many metaphysicians—even neo-
Quineans-- take some subset of these assumptions for granted. Hence my second aim: if the 
views of many metaphysicians entail metaphysical logical realism, then they must cease treating 
logic as a neutral background to their arguments; they must cease appealing to logical principles 
uncritically in arguing for metaphysical conclusions; and generally speaking, they should be 
more interested in the logical commitments of their views.  
 
                                                        
1 E.g. Read (2006), Priest (2006a), Williamson (2013, 2017); my sense is that many metaphysicians implicitly 
endorse something in the ballpark. 
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1. What it means for there to be One True Logic 
 
‘Logical realism’ is sometimes used to just refer to the claim that there is OTL: that certain 
logical principles (which together are enough to constitute a logic) are true, and others are false. 
But metaphysical logical realism is clearly a distinct species of this kind of logical realism. We 
can see this by thinking in terms of truthmakers. What kinds of things make the OTL true? 
Different answers generate very different theoretical commitments about what it really is to be 
committed to there being OTL.2  
 
Let metaphysical logical realism be the conjunction of the following claims:  
(a) There is OTL.  
(b) What makes the OTL true is the mind-and-language-independent world.  
(c) The mind-and-language-independent world makes the OTL metaphysically privileged: 
better than any other logic at capturing the nature of reality.  
 
Some have distinguished something like metaphysical logical realism from other forms of logical 
realism by appealing to the question of whether logic is in the world or is representational. (E.g. 
Rush (2014) Tahko (2014).) I don’t put things this way in order to accommodate the view that (i) 
it is a category mistake to think that logic is in the mind-and-language independent world (if one 
thinks that logic has to do with linguistic entities and the relations between them), but (ii) the 
reason that it is correct to use a certain logic to describe the world is that the logic conforms to 
the structure of the world.  
 
Others have discussed the merits of a principle of independence: that the logical truths are true 
independent of our minds/language. (E.g. Resnik (1999), La Pointe (2014)). This is closer to the 
way I have defined metaphysical logical realism; but in section two I will tie one kind of 
metaphysical logical realism to appearance in descriptions of reality, which complicates treating 
realism as requiring language-independence.  
 
Without (c), my definition is weak and uninteresting: it allows for views on which the OTL is 
relative to something (a language, a frame of reference, a mathematical structure (e.g. Shapiro 
2014), a particular notion of validity (e.g. Beall and Restall (2006); it would also allow for 
Carnap’s principle of tolerance, (1937, section 17), which metaphysical logical realism should 
rule out). The problem is that the truthmaking relation invoked in (b) is not fine-grained enough. 
(c) ensures that the OTL is not relative to the language that we happen to speaking, or to the 
particular mathematical structure we happen to be focusing on.   
 
Many take truthmakers for the true logical principles to lie somewhere in our psychology, our 
concepts, our minds, or our language. On this view—call it broad psychologism--the OTL is true 
in virtue of correctly describing something about us or the way we represent things: the way we 
actually reason, the way our concepts are actually divided up, or the way our languages are 
actually structured. What distinguishes the OTL from false logics is that false logics do not 
correctly describe any of these things. Broad psychologism might count as realism; its 
proponents think that there is a single logic (or a small plurality) that correctly captures 
                                                        
2 I use the machinery of truthmakers throughout the paper; it would be easy enough to reconstruct the discussion, 
and my argument, without them.  
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something objective about reality; and that the logical principles of that one logic are actually 
true, whereas the logical principles of other logics are (perhaps) false. But broad psychologism 
does not count as a metaphysical logical realist view, because it locates the truthmakers for true 
logical principles in us, or our language, and makes no further attempt to connect us up to mind-
and-language-independent reality.  
 
There is a version of broad psychologism—call it ‘logical rationalism’--which might count as 
metaphysical logical realism, but it involves controversial assumptions. Logical rationalism says 
that it is indeed the structure of our minds, concepts, or language that make the OTL true; but 
that, in turn, our minds, concepts, and language correspond accurately to mind-and-language-
independent reality; and so ultimately, the OTL is made true by mind-and-language-independent 
reality, while somehow being mediated by facts about us. But that is just for simplicity’s sake; 
we should treat logical rationalism as a metaphysical realist view.3  
 
Another view about the OTL is that its truthmakers are the correct norms of reasoning. This 
could count as metaphysical logical realism, depending on how it is cashed out. Those who 
believe that the OTL captures the correct norms of reasoning, and are perfectly objective, but 
don’t think that those norms come directly from mind-and-language-independent reality (e.g. 
neo-Kantians like Leech (2015)) do not count as metaphysical logical realists, because they don’t 
think that those norms are connected up with mind-and-language-independent reality in a 
straightforward fashion. But someone who thinks that logic is about norms of rationality, and 
those norms of rationality immediately come from mind-and-language-independent reality, might 
count as a metaphysical logical realist.   
 
There are many other ways to maintain that there is OTL, and many issues I have not discussed; 
one important one is the relationship between analyticity and logical truths; another is that many 
philosophers of logic talk as though logic’s goal is to capture a particular consequence relation; 
so the OTL might be better cast as the logic with the right consequence relation (it is easy to 
restate the views above in terms of a consequence relation, but there are differences between the 
approaches). My goal here is not to examine all of the possible answers to what makes the OTL 
the OTL, but to zero in on metaphysical logical realism and one argument for it.  
 
2. Metaphysical Logical Realism 
 
In the remainder of the paper, I focus on views on which the OTL is true in virtue of correctly 
capturing the structure of reality. In my (**), I distinguish between two forms of metaphysical 
logical realism: ontological logical realism and ideological logical realism.  
 
Ontological (metaphysical) logical realists—hereafter ‘ontological realists’—think that the OTL 
is true in virtue of directly reflecting something about items in our ontology. For example, one 
might think that ‘&’ refers to some kind of conjunctive function that is an important part of 
reality. One view on which this might be true says that reality is made up of something like 
Armstrongian facts, and that among those facts are conjunctive facts which have constituents that 
                                                        
3 I am not sure whether anyone holds this view, exactly. The closest views I know of are Evnine’s (ms) 
interpretation of Frege, Jenkins (2014), and Maddy (2002, 2014). It has also been suggested to me that this is Kant’s 
view, but I hesitate to attribute it to him.  
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are something like functions that “hold” two conjuncts of afact together. Another says that some 
kind of abstract logical entities (functions, law-like things, truth values, propositions, etc.) live in 
a “third realm” and make the logical truths true (e.g. on some readings (e.g. Burge (1992)), 
Frege’s (1918) view belongs here, as perhaps does Husserl’s (1900).).  
 
Ideological (metaphysical) logical realists—hereafter ‘ideological realists’—think that the OTL 
is the OTL in virtue of being a part of the language (ideology) that best captures the structure of 
reality. The most obvious example of a contemporary ideological realist is Sider (2011), who 
argues that logical notions are in the most fundamental language—the language that perfectly 
captures reality’s structure—but that there are not bits of fundamental ontology to which logical 
terms refer. I’m inclined to think that Maddy, who argues that “logical truths are true because the 
world is made up of objects enjoying various interrelations with dependencies between them” 
(2002, p. 501), counts as an ideological realist, though given Maddy’s story about epistemology, 
our cognition of logic, and idealization in theories, it’s possible she wouldn’t like the way I’ve 
stated the view.  
 
Not all ways of being a metaphysical logical realist neatly divide into ontological or ideological 
realism. For example, Tahko (2009) addresses the issue of whether the Law of Non-
Contradiction might be a metaphysical, rather than merely logical, law or principle. Whether this 
view counts as ontological or ideological realism will depend on the status of these metaphysical 
laws: if the laws are roughly Humean--are merely descriptive of reality’s structure, and are not 
additional items in our ontology, then it may be a version of ideological realism. If the laws are 
roughly anti-Humean—if they are primitive items in our ontology, or if they are “oomphy” and 
constrain or determine reality--then it may be a version of ontological realism. But in what 
follows, I will focus on more straightforward versions of ideological realism. 
 
In the remainder of this section, I will argue that anyone who thinks that reality has a privileged 
metaphysical structure should be an ideological realist.  
 
Metaphysicians often focus on the question of what fundamental reality is like. Those who give a 
positive answer to this question typically attribute a structure to reality. What is it to think that 
reality has a privileged structure? Rather than define the notion, I will just say that all of the 
following sorts of views are committed to reality having a privileged structure:  
 
-Fundamentally, the world consists only in objects.  
-Fundamentally, the world consists only in properties (e.g. Paul (2002), Cover and    
 O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998).  
-Fundamentally, the world consists only in a single, purely general fact (e.g. Dasgupta  
 (2009).) 
-Fundamentally, the world consists in only states of affairs (e.g. Armstrong (1997)).  
-Fundamentally, the world consists in a single structured object (e.g. Schaffer (2010)).  
-I’m not sure what the world fundamentally consists in, but it does have some structure  
 and science is probably going to eventually help me figure out what that is. 
 And so on.  
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The only kinds of views that don’t count as views on which reality has a privileged structure are 
those like the following:  
 
-The world consists in a single unstructured (or completely indeterminately structured)  
 object.  
-Insofar as there is an “external” question about what reality is really like, it can only be  
 answered pragmatically; all we can do is give true descriptions of it in whatever  
 language we happen to be speaking. (e.g. Carnap 1950, Thomasson 2015.)  
-There is no metaphysical fact of the matter about which empirically adequate theory is  
 true.  
-All of these descriptions of reality are equivalent, and there is nothing more to say (e.g. 
about some issues, Rayo (2013) and Hirsch (2009), (2010)).  
And so on.  
 
In order to argue that all of the views of the first type are committed to metaphysical logical 
realism, I first want to introduce some useful distinctions, adapted from Rayo (2013). 
Metaphysicalism, according to Rayo, is the combination of two claims:  
 
(a) Reality has a metaphysical structure--there is a single “metaphysically privileged way of 
carving up reality into its constituent parts”. (6),  
(b) “In order for an atomic sentence to be true, there needs to be a certain kind of 
correspondence between the logical form of a sentence… and the metaphysical structure of 
reality”. (6). 
 
Moderate metaphysicalism is the combination of (a) and:  
 
(c) Fundamentally speaking, or when we are explicitly trying to capture the correct metaphysics 
of reality, (b) holds; but it doesn’t hold generally—we can say all sorts of true things about 
reality that don’t perfectly capture the metaphysical structure of reality. (9).  
 
With these views on the table, the argument goes as follows.  
 
P1: Anyone who thinks that reality has a privileged structure must be either a 
metaphysicalist or a moderate metaphysicalist.  
 
P2:  Metaphysicalists and moderate metaphysicalists are committed to metaphysical 
logical realism (typically ideological, rather than ontological).  
 
Conclusion: Anyone who thinks that reality has a privileged structure is committed to 
metaphysical logical realism.  
 
Something like this conclusion seems to be assumed by many philosophers. For example, Priest 
(2006b, p. 302) says that “metaphysical dialetheism is simply a consequence of semantic 
dialetheism plus the appropriate form of metaphysical realism”. (Semantic dialetheism is the 
view that dialetheism lives at the level of semantics, any true contradiction could be re-described 
in another possible language in a consistent way; metaphysical dialetheism, translated into my 
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framework, is something like the view that there are “contradictionmakers” in the world, and the 
only (or perhaps best) way to capture them linguistically is via true contradictions.) Wyatt (2004) 
gives a related argument for the incompatibility of Beall-and-Restall-style logical pluralism and 
monism about metaphysical modality. Sider (2009) argues (in different terms) for moderate 
metaphysicalism, and also that logical expressions will appear in the most fundamental 
description of reality. (Sider argues that particular logical expressions will appear in most 
fundamental theory; so, he doesn’t make the general argument I make here, but it does seem to 
follow from his views in (2011, ch. 10), and it also follows from his arguments about quantifier 
variance in his back-and-forth with Hirsch (Hirsch (2009), (2010), Sider (2009), (2011)).) 
Something like the argument is in the background of Putnam’s work on quantum logic ((1975), 
(1994)). And, as we’ll see, Dasgupta (2009) makes a similar assumption.  
 
Since moderate metaphysicalism is weaker, in the respects relevant to P1 and P2, than 
metaphysicalism, I will only argue for the claims about moderate metaphysicalism in what 
follows.  
 
One option is to stipulate that P1 is true, by saying: what I mean by (c) is that, in the ontology 
room, the following holds:  
 
In order for an atomic sentence to be true*, there needs to be a certain kind of 
correspondence between the logical form of a sentence… and the metaphysical structure 
of reality.  
 
Where ‘true*’ means the following: a sentence is true* if and only if its logical form directly 
corresponds to the structure of metaphysical reality.  
 
If this is what (c) means, then P1 is true by definition. If one thinks that reality has a privileged 
metaphysical structure, then I am simply stipulating that there is a property, truth*, which 
sentences have just in case they have a logical form that corresponds to the metaphysical 
structure of reality. The only real assumption needed to get us the premise is that there is a 
context in which it is worth trying to say only things that are true*. (I’ll say something to 
motivate this below.)  
 
But there is also an argument for P1. If I think that reality has a particular privileged structure, 
then presumably there are at least some contexts in which I want to communicate what it is like 
to others. I should want to communicate the facts about various regions of reality in a way that 
best captures what I actually think that those regions of reality are like. For example, if I am a 
strict generalist—I think that there are not really individuals, not even non-fundamental ones, but 
rather that there are is just one big fact--I will think that there are no such thing as tables or 
coffee cups.  I might maintain that in the day-to-day, it is okay for us to say, in English, that the 
coffee cup is on the table. But sometimes, I need to say that I don’t really believe there are tables 
or coffee cups.  
 
You might object by claiming that reality has a particular privileged structure, but that it is 
simply unimportant what reality is really like, because (e.g.) you think that there are political or 
practical matters that we must instead attend to. But note that successfully forming the belief that 
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within reality’s privileged structure, there are no tables or coffee cups requires that we need to 
think in a context in which we can distinguish this view from the view that there are tables and 
coffee cups. So even if we think our views don’t matter, in order to hold them in the first place, 
we need a context in which we can distinguish them. 
 
Suppose again that I am a generalist, and you are an individualist. We need to find ways to state 
how we think about comparable chunks of reality which showcase the differences between what 
we are committed to. You need to be able to say that there is a brown table; I need to be able to 
state my claim about that chunk of reality, which is hard in English, but is something like 
“browness and tableness (here)”. We don’t agree about what reality is like in the table-y region 
of reality in front of us; and we need a way to state our views such that (a) it is clear what each of 
us thinks is going on in the table-y region in front of us and (b) it is clear exactly how we 
disagree. You might say ‘($x)(Bx&Tx). As Dasgupta (2009, p. 50) points out, I might say 
something superficially similar, using what looks like predicate logic with identity but without 
individual constants: ‘($x)(Bx&Tx)’. But we mean different things by our existential quantifier 
and bound variables. This is non-ideal: it transforms our disagreement about the metaphysical 
question of what reality is really like to one about what our logical terms mean; and, at best, 
results in us having to do something like subscript our expressions to distinguish them from one 
another.  
 
What is important here is that our two sentences make wildly different logical commitments, 
even if they have superficially similar logical forms. We might both be able to use something 
that looks like this: ‘($x)(Bx&Tx)’ to express our views in the ontology room, but this is not 
because there is some logically neutral way that we can communicate our views. It is because the 
logical commitments of our respective sentences correspond to the metaphysical structure we 
posit. To see this, note the following: if I decide to use ‘&’ to express conjunction, and you use it 
to express neither/nor, then when I write down ‘A&B’ and you write down ‘A&B’, these are 
distinct sentences which have distinct logical commitments.  
 
The same is true with respect to what the generalist and the individualist use ‘$’ and ‘x’ to 
symbolize. While I don’t have the space to explain how the generalist re-interprets these 
symbols, what matters is that the generalist’s quantifier will clearly have (a) a distinct semantics, 
(b) a distinct inferential role, and (c) if it refers to anything, its referent will be distinct. (a)-(c) 
exhaust the standard accounts of logical constants. So the sentences contain distinct logical 
constants. So, if logical form is individuated by what logical constants actually appear in a 
sentence, these sentences have distinct logical forms. (If it isn’t, no matter: we can define a 
notion of logical form*, and replace “logical form” with “logical form*”.)  
 
The best reason for the generalist to use an alternative logic (in Dasgupta’s case, predicate 
functorese) is that the sentence ‘($x)(Bx&Tx)’, even re-interpreted so as not to quantify over 
individuals, obscures the metaphysical commitments of generalism; it would be better to 
communicate using a sentence the grammar of which corresponds to the structure of reality, so 
we can easily see the commitments of the sentence (hence, predicate functorese, which is not 
even superficially committed to individuals). (Dasgupta says something somewhat similar.) But 
either way of going demonstrates that the generalist has distinct logical commitments from the 
individualist; what matters is that the generalist and the individualist are using distinct logical 
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concepts to state their views, and that they each understand that they are using distinct logical 
concepts. What does not matter as much (here I part ways with Sider (2011)) is how they 
represent those concepts.  
 
More simply: if one thinks that the world has a privileged metaphysical structure, then one needs 
a way to express that structure that distinguishes it from other possible structures the world could 
have. If we grant that all of the descriptions are true, regardless of which one we think is 
privileged, then we need some other way to express the differences between what we are 
committed to. The best way to do this is to state things with distinct logical forms that wear their 
grammar on their face—logical forms that correspond to the structure of what it is that we are 
actually committed to, metaphysically speaking. So long as it is clear that we have different 
logical commitments—that we require different logical concepts to state our views in a way that 
differentiate them from one another—that is enough to recover what is important about moderate 
metaphysicalism here. 
 
Once one is clear on what ideological realism is really committed to, one should automatically 
accept P2. Ideological realism says that the OTL is true in virtue of being a part of the language 
that best captures the structure of reality. Moderate metaphysicalists think that there is a 
language that best captures the structure of reality. The only real question is whether that 
language has a logic. But I take it that it is obvious that, in every case, it will. 
 
I will quickly address two worries. First: is it really right that everyone  who is committed to a 
privileged worldly structure need a logic to best describe that structure? I think so, but one case 
troubles me.  First case you might be concerned by: suppose that you think the world only 
consists in unstructured atomistic facts, as defended by Turner (2016). You still need an 
ideology—a theory—that is going to explain how those atomistic facts relate to one another 
(hence, Turner’s quasi-geometric logical space, and the “relations” that hold between facts in 
that space).  
 
Second: even if we grant that if reality is structured, it has some kind of logical structure (e.g. 
object-predicate structure if one thinks that fundamentally, there are objects instantiating 
properties), why think it has anything more than that? Why think we need any logical 
connectives, quantifiers, etc.? I haven’t shown that we do; but it is hard to give the best 
description of reality without some logical constants or other. Here, I’ve just argued that 
commitment to metaphysical structure entails some minimal commitments to logical structure.  
 
A different worry is whether ideological realism should really count as metaphysical logical 
realism. It is importantly different from ontological realism; but it is committed to important 
metaphysical claims about the relationship between logic and the world: even if there are no 
ontological correlates of logical constants that are strictly speaking, a part of the world, the case 
the world is still the truthmaker for the OTL, and the world still makes the OTL metaphysically 
better than any other logic.   
 
I conclude that anyone who thinks that reality has a privileged metaphysical structure is 
committed to metaphysical logical realism. (If one thinks that there are logical items—e.g. laws, 
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functions, abstract objects--in fundamental reality, then one is already committed to ontological 
realism—I don’t discuss this issue here.)  
 
I should clarify something about fundamentality. I’ve assumed that there is a difference between 
fundamental reality and reality. But one needn’t believe this in order to accept that reality having 
a specific structure entails that metaphysical logical realism is true. One simply needs the claim 
that reality is structured a certain way. Those who think that there is a single structure to reality, 
and that there is no sense to be made of reality having “levels”, may want to be metaphysicalists 
rather than moderate metaphysicalists (they should go this way if they have a very permissive 
ontology); or they may want to be moderate metaphysicalists, and provide a story of why we can 
say true things about non-existent entities (they should go this way if they think all there is is, 
e.g., what other metaphysicians might posit as existing at the fundamental level).  
 
What about the claim that reality has multiple privileged structures? So long as some structures 
are not privileged, the spirit of metaphysical logical realism persists, but we might need to 
replace (a) with something like:  
 
(a*): There are Some True Logics.  
 
This means that there are multiple logics that best capture the structure of reality; the structure of 
reality makes Some True Logics true; but not just anything goes. There are at least two other 
ways we might go here: first, perhaps, there is an OTL: perhaps the right way to understand 
reality having multiple privileged structures is that we need to construct a “super logic” that 
allows for all of the distinct structures there are. One way of understanding this claim is the 
following: suppose that reality has both generalist structure and individualist structure. Perhaps 
the OTL is one that treats whether the table is brown or tableness, brownness (here) as ontically 
vague; in which case it might be that there is still a single OTL, it is just a logic that allows for 
vagueness between two different descriptions of reality. (See Barnes (2010) and Barnes and 
Williams (2011) for related discussion.). Even those who think that reality has multiple 
privileged structures count as (perhaps modified) metaphysical logical realists.  
 
3. Logical Unity?  
 
I will end by discussing whether logic is a unified subject—whether, in the words of Eklund 
(forthcoming) it has a “single canonical purpose”. Obviously we use logic for different purposes. 
We use fuzzy logic for programming rice cookers. Programming a rice cooker has a distinct 
end—cooking rice well—than the kind of metaphysical theorizing I have been discussing here 
does (which has as its end something like most accurately describing reality). How can the 
question of whether there is OTL make sense if different uses of logics have different ends? 
Maybe logic is not unified; there is “OTL” for programming rice cookers, another “OTL” for 
describing fundamental reality, another for purely descriptively capturing natural language 
reasoning, and so on. 
 
I will make one conciliatory comment about this, and one far less conciliatory one.  
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The conciliatory comment is this: if logic is not unified, then those philosophers who think that 
the truthmakers for the OTL claim are not in the mind-and-language-independent world needn’t 
rule out that there is also a OTL that best describes the structure of reality (if ideological realism 
is true). Metaphysical logical realism would have to be reformulated, since I defined it by 
appealing to there being a OTL. But the general argument for realism could easily be recovered. 
Anyone who thinks that the world has a privileged metaphysical structure should think that there 
is a goal of logic which is to capture that structure. We are also free to think that there are other 
goals for logic.  
 
The less conciliatory comment is this: I think that logic is unified, and that at least many claims 
about logic ultimately lead to the claim that the OTL reflects the privileged structure of reality. 
For example, if one thinks that the OTL is the logic that captures the correct norms of reasoning 
or thought, one must have some kind of epistemic goals in mind; one of these goals is probably 
making inferences that preserve truth. But insofar as what is true has something to do with what 
the world is like, then there should be some relationship between the world and these truth-
preserving inferences. If one thinks that reality has a privileged structure, then one should think 
that our inferences should also preserve that structure. Alternatively, one might think that the 
norms of thought are in mind-and-language-independent reality already, in which case it is 
obvious that the answer to the “which norms of thought” question bottoms out in the privileged 
structure of reality.  
 
What about the rice cooker? We need a metaphysical story about why the rice cooker is best 
programmed with fuzzy logic; if we think that everything bottoms out in the privileged structure 
of reality, then such a story will explain how the privileged structure of reality gives rise both to 
rice cookers, and to the fact that rice cookers are best programmed using fuzzy logic. It doesn’t 
follow that the OTL is fuzzy logic; but it might follow that the OTL needs to be a part of a story 
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